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German unemployed who turned 58 and were registered in the Public Employment Service 
had until the end of 2007 the option to avoid job-search monitoring without sanction if they 
agreed to retire as soon as they were eligible for an old age pension. In this study we ana-
lyze the impact of job search monitoring on reservation wages of older welfare benefit recipi-
ents using as identification strategy age discontinuity in the eligibility rule to participate in the 
program. Our results indicate that participation in the program increases reservation wages. 
However, the question whether this has an effect on unemployment duration remains open 
for further research.* 
 
JEL classification: C41, J64, J65 
Keywords: Job search, reservation wage, regression discontinuity 
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1. Motivation  
Active job seeking is a primary requirement for receiving unemployment benefits in 
most countries. Monitoring job search efforts is often viewed as one of the major 
ways to activate unemployed individuals (e.g. Fredriksson and Holmlund 2006a). 
However, there is scant literature on the effect of job search monitoring on the dif-
ferent aspects of job search behavior of the unemployed.  
Johnson and Klepinger (1994), Boone et al. (2001) and Fredriksson and Holmlund 
(2006b) present models in which job search monitoring reduces the duration of un-
employment spells and increases job entry rates.1 Van den Berg and van der 
Klaauw (2006) distinguish between formal and informal job search channels. In this 
model, an increase in job search monitoring may lead to a substitution between the 
two channels of job searching. Unemployed workers will increase formal job search 
but decrease informal job search. The overall impact of monitoring remains ambigu-
ous and depends on the effectiveness of each type of job search. Manning (2005) 
concludes that unemployed workers may reduce search efforts and move to unreg-
istered unemployment if the search requirements are set too high. Menard (2006) 
distinguishes between monitoring search intensity and monitoring rejection of suit-
able job offers. The author shows that monitoring search intensity has a positive 
effect on the exit rate out of unemployment while monitoring job refusals leads to a 
decrease in search intensity. 
Empirical evidence on the effect of monitoring provides a mixed picture since it is 
often hard to keep apart the effect of increased monitoring and accompanying 
measures, such as increased job search assistance or sanctions (see Meyer, 1995; 
Gorter and Kalb, 1996; Dolton and O’Neill, 1996; Blundell et al., 2004;). Some re-
cent US studies based on an experimental design solved the issue of separating the 
effects of monitoring and sanctions. These studies, however, produce contradictory 
results: while Klepinger et al. (2002) find a reduction  in the length of Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) spells, Ashenfelter et al. (2005) provide evidence that the duration of 
the UI spell is not affected by intensified monitoring. However, the sample size and 
insufficient magnitude of monitoring of the second study may raise doubts about this 
conclusion (e.g. Klepinger et al. 2002). Klepinger et al. (2002) compare a group not 
affected by monitoring to a group which was subject to monitoring by telephone fol-
low-up. The results suggest that monitored individuals tend to spend less time un-
employed compared to the group with no monitoring.  
Recent studies for Europe try to isolate the impact of monitoring from other factors. 
Cockx and Dejemeppe (2007) find a positive effect of the threat of monitoring on the 
employment probability of highly skilled workers in Belgium. However, increased 
reemployment probability comes at a cost. Highly skilled unemployed who were 
monitored accepted lower paid part time jobs. Petrongolo (2009) provides further 
evidence that stricter job search monitoring is a successful strategy to move indi-
viduals out of unemployment in Britain in the short run. The effect is, however, re-
                                                
1 Provided that monitoring is not too costly. 
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versed in the long run; four years after the program finished the treated group had 
lower earnings and higher incidence of unemployment compared to the control 
group. McVicar (2008) explores job search monitoring policy variations in Ireland. 
The author finds that periods of suspension in job search monitoring led to a signifi-
cantly lower exit rates from unemployment and increased duration of the unem-
ployment spell.2  
In the present paper we rely on a natural experiment produced by German regula-
tors. German unemployed turning 58 years have the option to receive unemploy-
ment benefits without the obligation to search for jobs (RULE58).3 The motivation of 
individuals when they decide to participate can be two-fold: some individuals may 
decide to keep looking for a job without the strict monitoring rules, and some indi-
viduals may decide to enroll in the program as a way of entering inactivity and stop 
job searching (Brussig and Wübbeke, 2008). 
In the present paper, we analyze the effect of entering the program without distin-
guishing between these different motivations. Therefore, we will be able to conclude 
how reservation wages react to the elimination of strict job search monitoring, but 
we are not able to observe whether this reduction is associated with the decision to 
leave the labour market or with the decision to dispense with institutional job search 
support. 
A priori, it is not clear whether participation in RULE58 increases reservation wages. 
In a theoretical job search framework, the unemployed person perceives job search 
monitoring on the one hand as having costs and thus, disutility, leading to reduced 
reservation wages. Furthermore, since for some participants, participation in 
RULE58 is associated with a transition into inactivity, it is likely that for those partici-
pants a job offer has to be very attractive to be accepted. Thus, we can assume that 
the effect of transition into inactivity leads to an increase in reservation wages. But 
monitoring the job search might also increase the skills of unemployed workers to 
find work and therefore be perceived as additional utility, leading to increased reser-
vation wages. However, taking into account the characteristics of our population 
(older long term unemployed) we expect this second effect to be small and hence 
we expect the general effect of RULE58 on reservation wages to be positive.  
The empirical analysis confirms this prediction. In all specifications considered, en-
rolment in RULE58 implies a substantial increase in reservation wages. Thus, re-
sults suggest that job search monitoring indeed changes the job search behavior of 
unemployed individuals by reducing their reservation wages.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section describes 
the institutional framework of the German RULE58. Section 3 describes the data 
and the sample selection. Our identification strategy and results are presented in 
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
                                                
2 The author reports similar findings using local administrative data (see McVicar, 2009)  
3 Although this program (RULE58) was terminated by the end of 2007, for simplicity reasons we use 
the present verbal conjugation.    
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2. Institutional framework 
Germany entered the new century with symptoms of economic stagnation. At this 
time, the country was seen as unable to proceed with the reforms needed to react to 
the adverse economic situation (Eichhorst and Zimmermann, 2007; Kemmerling and 
Bruttel, 2005). In response to these critics, the government set up a policy commis-
sion in the year 2002 in order to reform labor market policies including the unem-
ployment benefit system and Germany’s Public Employment Service (PES). Labor 
market reform, which rooted in the recommendations of this commission (Hartz-
Reform), was implemented in four subsequent steps between 2003 and 2005 and 
can be grouped in three clusters.  
The first cluster involved a reform of the Public Employment Service designed to 
introduce more efficiency with new public management ideas. The second cluster 
reformed the unemployment benefit system. Before the reforms, unemployed indi-
viduals were first entitled to unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Periods of con-
tributory employment prior to benefit claim defined first of all eligibility for UI and 
second its potential duration. The maximum duration of UI was 32 months and de-
pended on the length of contributory work-history during a specific period prior to the 
benefit claim together with age. The amount of UI benefits depended on the previ-
ous wage and whether or not a person was childless (67 % of the last wage for par-
ents and 60 % for childless people.).  After the expiration of UI benefits, unemployed 
were entitled to an unlimited period of unemployment assistance,the level of which 
depended on income earned before unemployment. Additionally, individuals entitled 
neither to unemployment benefits nor to unemployment assistance (mainly individu-
als without any contribution period) were receiving welfare which was means tested.  
The new benefit system introduced by the Hartz IV Act reduced the maximum period 
of entitlement to UI benefits to 12 months for individuals aged 45 to 54 and 18 
months for individuals aged at least 55 (Unemployment Benefit I (UB I)).4 Further-
more, unemployment assistance and welfare were brought together in the so-called 
Unemployment Benefit II (UB II) which is comparable to welfare in other countries 
since it is a means-tested benefit designed to protect the recipient from poverty. It is 
paid by the government to all needy individuals who are classified as able-to-work. 
In the following, we refer to welfare recipients when we discuss recipients of UB II. 
Finally, there is a possibility for all needy individuals not entitled to UB I and UB II to 
receive social assistance.  
The third cluster reformed active labor market policy. In order to activate jobseekers, 
some push factors were introduced in the benefit system like tailored assistance, a 
strict regime with respect to job-search requirements, the introduction of stricter 
benefit sanctions and the obligation to take up suitable work. 
Although the Hartz-Reform was a comprehensive reform, there were older regula-
tions which survived even if they were contradictory to the main principles of the 
                                                
4 At the beginning of 2008 entitlement lengths were again raised to 15 months for 50 to 54 years olds 
and to 24 months for those over 57.  
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reform. An example of such a regulation is RULE58, which was first introduced in 
1986.5  
According to this regulation, unemployed aged 58 and over who are entitled to an 
old-age pension can choose to be exempted from standard job search requirements 
while still receiving unemployment benefits and are not counted as unemployed.6 If 
unemployed choose to enroll in RULE58, they have to declare that they will apply for 
their old-age pension as soon as they are eligible without reductions due to early 
retirement. Enrollment in RULE58 implies that participants are not intensively moni-
tored as non-participants, they are not offered jobs and active labor market meas-
ures, and they are not sanctioned for not looking actively for a job. 
In practice, most people do not receive an unreduced old-age pension before they 
turn 65 years; hence, from 58 to 65 years, participants in the RULE58 program re-
ceive regular welfare benefits and are allowed to use placement services of the em-
ployment office without obligations to prove that they fulfill job search requirements.7 
They have neither to prove search efforts of their own, sign an individual action plan, 
report regularly to the employment office nor accept any suitable job offer or activa-
tion measure. Individuals are allowed to travel up to seventeen weeks per year as 
opposed to three weeks for individuals not affected by RULE58. 
The program is popular and the number of persons opting for it has grown over time 
(Brussig and Wübbeke 2008). While in the 1990s, less than 1/3 of unemployed per-
sons of age 58 to 64 participated in the program, in 2007, around 60% of the UB I 
benefit recipients and 23% of the welfare recipients aged 58 to 65 enrolled in the 
program (statistics of the Federal Employment Agency; Schneider and Stuhler, 
2007; Brussig and Wübbeke, 2008). Schneider and Stuhler (2007) estimate the total 
fiscal costs of the RULE58 to be 850 million Euro per year in the absence of spill-
over effects. The costs further increase to 2.6 billion Euros if one accounts for pos-
sible displacement effects of RULE58. These estimations can be seen as an upper 
bound of the costs of the program since Schneider and Stuhler (2007) take as com-
parison an average worker who continues to work until turning 65 years, arguably a 
positive selection for the comparison group of participants in RULE58. Even so, the 
fiscal costs of program implementation mirror the high take-up-rates.  
                                                
5 A conservative government introduced RULE58 for recipients of UI benefits one year before the 
parliamentary elections of 1987, in the face of a dramatic increase in unemployment rates (from 
3.8% in 1980 to 9.3% in 1985). Individuals enrolling in this scheme disappear from the unemploy-
ment statistics. Therefore, this program has been criticized as a way of ‘retouching’ unemployment 
statistics. The regulation was extended in 2005 for recipients of the new welfare benefit (unemploy-
ment benefit II) (Manow and Seils 2000). 
6 ‘58er Regelung’, §428 SC III and §65,4 SC II. Brussig and Wübbeke (2008) offer a comprehensive 
description of the program. 
7 For UI recipients it was possible until to the end of the 1990s to exit employment at age 58 into 
unemployment with UI entitlements of up to 36 months and to enter a deduction-free pension at the 
age of 60. Today, UI entitlements last for a maximum of 18 months, and deduction-free pensions 
start at the age 63 or 65. For our sample, i.e. the population of welfare recipients, deduction-free 
pensions start at 65. 
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Special rules for older unemployed workers are widespread in European countries. 
In most member states of the European Union there are special rules for older un-
employed workers which offer more generous benefits and longer entitlement peri-
ods. Also regulations which relax for them conditions regarding availability for work 
and job search like the RULE58 are widespread (European Commission, 2004). 
These regulations have in common that they may reduce the labour supply of older 
workers by reducing incentives to look for a job. Although these programs have 
been criticised in the context of promotion of longer working lives, they still exist and 
further discussion on them is needed. 
3. Data 
The empirical analysis is based on the data from a cross-sectional survey called 
“Life situation and social security 2005” which was conducted on the behalf of the 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) in winter 2005/2006. The study aimed at an 
examination of the effects of the recent Hartz IV reform in Germany. The survey 
addressed 20,832 individuals affected by the reform: first, a sample of unemployed 
recipients of the new welfare benefit (UB II) in January 2005 and second, a sample 
of unemployed recipients of unemployment assistance in December 2004, who lost 
their entitlement to benefits as consequence of the reform.8 
This study focuses on the first stock sample of 15,219 needy and able-to-work wel-
fare recipients in January 2005. The interviews took place in winter 2005/2006. The 
topics of the survey include among others individual characteristics, family back-
ground, education and work history, receipt of benefits, participation in employment 
and training schemes sponsored by the public employment service, old-age provi-
sions and plans for the transition from work to retirement.  
The study contains detailed information on reservation wages and participation in 
RULE58. The survey measures two sets of wages. The first wage is the wage job 
seekers expect to earn in a post unemployment job. The second wage measures 
the minimum wage job seekers are willing to accept, i.e. the reservation wage.9 Ar-
guably, the graduated compilation of hourly reservation wages transmits the idea of 
                                                
8 Unemployed are defined as registered with the employment agency as unemployed or job-seeking. 
Most welfare recipients are long-term unemployed but long-term unemployment is not a preconditi-
on for welfare receipt. Welfare recipients include all those who work and do not achieve sufficient 
earnings to cover the needs of their household and unemployed who did recently work, but not un-
der social insurance or long enough to be entitled to UI benefit when they lost their job. Our sample, 
though, only includes unemployed welfare recipients.  
9 The exact questions are: 1.) „What net wage do you expect to earn per month?” together with a question 
asking how many hours per week the person would expect to work for the reported amount. 2.a) Persons who 
answered question 1) are asked in a second step if they would be willing to work for a monthly net wage lower 
than the first reported value. If so, they are asked about the minimum level of this lower wage for them 
still to be willing to work. Again, persons are asked for the working hours per week they expect to work for 
this reported wage. 2.b). Persons who refuse to answer question 1) are in a second step asked: “What is the 
lowest net wage per month for which you would still be willing to work?” together with the working hours 
they would expect to work.  
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the reservation wage better to the respondents than a one-stage compiling of 
monthly information as typically done in similar surveys (e.g. the SOEP) leading to 
higher reliability of results. Regarding participation in RULE58, individuals aged 58 
to 65 years in winter 2005 are asked if they entered RULE58 and the exact month 
and year of entry.  
3.1  Sample selection and descriptive analysis  
Our dataset contains information on 15,219 unemployed who entered a welfare spell 
between January to March 2005. We restrict our sample to individuals born between 
December 1945 and December 1949 (14,170 observations are deleted) and who 
are eligible to an old age pension (178 observations are deleted). We further delete 
individuals with missing and implausible values of reservation wages.10 The result-
ing sample consists of 670 observations.11  
                                                
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for individuals not eligible to participate, eligi-
ble non-participants and participants in the program. We do not observe dramatic 
differences in the variables presented between eligible and non-eligible individuals; 
this implies that these variables are not highly correlated with eligibility status. The 
only variables where we observe some differences between both groups are gender 
and family status. Non-eligibles are more likely to be women and to have a partner 
than eligible individuals.  
Regarding differences between participants and non-participants (both eligible), we 
observe that living in East-Germany is positively associated with participation (al-
most 60% of all eligible non-participants but only 43% of all participants live in West-
Germany). We find other differences between participants and non-participants in 
the level of household income and in debts. Non-participants are more often in the 
highest household income level considered (>900€) and more often have debts than 
participants. Note that the correlation of the observed characteristics with eligibility 
status is not problematic for our identification strategy as long as there is no discon-
tinuity at age 58.  
The average hourly reservation wage in the total sample is slightly lower than six 
Euros. The low values of hourly reservation wage in the sample may be explained 
by the fact that we analyze the population of older welfare recipients.12 Eligible sam-
ple members have considerably higher reservation wages than non-eligibles: Par-
ticipants report a reservation wage of 6.22 Euro and eligible non-participants one of 
5.86 Euro. 
10 Missing values in reservation wage do not systematically differ between participants and non-
participants (Pearson’s chi-squared (1) =   0.6400   p = 0.424). To delete outliers we trim the first 
upper and lower percentile of the reservation wage.  
11 When interviewed, most people are still unemployed; only 6% are in unsubsidized employment. 
12 Net wages of six Euros per hour correspond to a wage offered by low-wage jobs in Germany. 
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It is important to keep in mind the possible causes for differences in reservation 
wages between participants and non-participants. Participants in the program are 
labeled as inactive while at the same time they are not intensively monitored, are not 
offered jobs and active labour market measures, and they are not sanctioned for not 
looking actively for a job. In our empirical analysis we do not distinguish between the 
different factors that may influence differences in reservation wages. We consider 
that it is a combination of the different factors what may cause different job search 
behavior of participants and non-participants. 
4. Identification strategy 
Ideally, to make a correct inference on the effect of monitoring, we need to observe 
reservation wage  and a binary treatment (participation) indicator  for each indi-
vidual  in two states (monitoring and not monitoring) simultaneously. The evalua-
tion problem arises because each individual is either monitored or not monitored 




Let  be the reservation wage given monitoring, and  the reservation wage 
in case of no monitoring. Then, the observed outcome can be defined as: 
 and a common regression model for the observed outcome 




)0()1( iii yty −
)1(iiii uty ++= αβ          
where )0()1( iii yy −=α  and iiii uuyEy +=+= β)]0([)0( . Non-random assignment 
between monitoring and non-monitoring state would generally not provide us with 
valid treatment effect estimate.  
In this paper, the source of identifying information of the effect comes from the fact 
that eligibility to the non-monitoring state changes discontinuously at age 58. This 
makes it possible to use a regression discontinuity design (RD).14 
Under a sharp RD, individuals are assigned to treatment solely on the basis of a cut-
off score of an observed continuous variable x , which in our case is age. Those 
individuals who fall above some distinct cut-off x  (i.e. age of 58) are placed in the 
non-monitoring group , while those below the cut-off are placed in the moni-
toring group . Thus assignment occurs through a known and measured de-
terminist decision rule: 
)1( =it
)0( =it
}{1)(xtti = xxi ≥=  where }{1 ⋅  is the indicator function. As the 
                                                
13 This section draws heavily on van der Klaauw (2008). 
14 For contributions to the development of the RD see, Trochim (1984); Hahn et al (2001) and a speci-
al issue of the Journal of Econometrics 2008, Volume 142, Issue 2. An up-to-date review of the app-
lication of the RD in economics is presented in Lee and Lemieux (2009). 
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assignment variable itself may be correlated with the outcome variable, the assign-
ment mechanism is clearly not random. However, if it is reasonable to believe that 
individuals close to the threshold with very similar x  are comparable, then we may 
view the design as almost experimental near the cut-off x . The idea underlining RD 
is to compare individuals who are marginally above or below some known eligibility 
threshold where the probability of being placed into the non-monitoring group 
changes discontinuously. Such individuals should have similar characteristics ex-
cept for participation in the program. In other words, inference made on the sample 
of individuals marginally above and below the eligibility threshold can be as good as 
a randomized experiment (e.g., Lee, 2008).  
An important assumption used in the identification strategy is the so-called Local 
Continuity (LC) assumption. The Local Continuity assumption rules out the possibil-
ity that other programs, which use precisely the same cut-off, will influence the out-
come. Moreover, the LC assumption prohibits a certain type of behavior on the part 
of participants and administrators. It is assumed that potential treatment recipients 
as well as program administrators can neither manipulate assignment variable nor 
the cut-off.15  
Application of the sharp RD assumes that all individuals who reach the threshold 
would participate in the program. In practice, some individuals choose to participate 
in the program while others continue to search for a job and be subject of monitor-
ing. In this case, where assignment to treatment often depends on x  in a stochastic 
manner we have a so-called fuzzy RD. Fuzzy RD design implies a change in the 
treatment probability less than one. In the latter case, one may instrument participa-
tion status by the “eligibility status”. The instrument “eligibility status” (i.e. reaching 
age 58) will only influence the decision to participate in the program, but not the out-
come reservation wage.  
More formally, assuming a homogeneous effect of participation in the program on 
reservation wage and one fix threshold we can write the fuzzy RD model (see van 
der Klaauw, 2002): 
(2)           )()|( uxaxTreatERw ++= γ   
(3)     )()({1)|( xbxxxTreatE +≥=η  
where  is the reservation wage, Treat  is the dummy of participation in RULE58. 
Finally  and  are flexible functions of enrolment, and .
Rw
)(⋅a )(⋅b 0)|( =xuE 16 The pa-
rameter γ  captures the casual effect on individuals, whose treatment status, partici-
pation in RULE58, changed as they crossed the eligibility threshold (i.e. became 
older than 58) and thus corresponds to the Local Average Treatment Effect. 
                                                
15 Lee (2008) shows, in the context of a sharp RD, that the continuity assumption will be satisfied if 
individuals do not have a perfect control over the position of the assignment variable relative to a 
cut-off.   
16 For simplicity we omit individual subscripts.  
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4.1 Results 
Figure 1 shows enrolment in RULE58. We observe a sharp increase in the number 
of participants in RULE58 after crossing the eligibility threshold (i.e. 58). At the same 
time not everyone participates in the program. It follows that participation in the pro-
gram is neither sharp nor fuzzy in the classical sense. Battistin and Rettore (2008) 
describe such an intermediate case and label it “partially fuzzy design” and provide 
its identification. The authors point out that the estimation of the “partially fuzzy de-
sign” is similar to that of a fuzzy design. Yet, “partially fuzzy design” offers a greater 
degree of flexibility when it comes to testing the assumptions underlying RD. We will 
describe the test suggested by Battistin and Rettore (2008) below. 
Figure 2 shows reservation wage means 24 months before and after eligibility to 
participate in the program. We observe that although there is a high degree of dis-
persion, there is an increasing trend in reservation wages after eligibility.  
We estimate the model equations (2) and (3) accounting explicitly for clustering of 
the regression errors at the age cell level to account for a possible specification error 
due to the fact that age is discrete in our data (see Lee and Card, 2008). Enrolment 
in RULE58 is instrumented by the eligibility status. The instrument “eligibility status” 
(i.e. reaching age 58) will only influence participation in treatment, but not the out-
come reservation wage.  
We present three specifications based on linear, quadratic polynomials and linear 
spline to account for nonlinearities and restrict the observation window to 24 months 
before and after the threshold. Another approach would be to restrict the data to a 
narrower observation window to avoid the problem of having to rely on functional 
form assumptions about the control function in identifying the effect. This approach 
could, however, produce imprecise measures of the effect since the regression-
discontinuity method is subject to a large degree of sampling variability.  
Initially, in all specifications we control for individual level covariates: gender, region 
(East/West Germany) and marital status (single). The main reason for the inclusion 
of the additional controls is to enhance the efficiency of the estimates (e.g., Lee, 
2008). Moreover and since our observation window is relatively wide, we may ex-
pect that baseline covariates may correlate with participation in the program and 
outcome (see Lee and Lemieux, 2009). The outcome reservation wage is trans-
formed into the logarithmic form.  
We start by presenting the results of the baseline specification in Table 2. The first 
stage regression predicting participation in RULE58 is instrumented by the eligibility 
status and yields satisfactory results (see Panel A). The coefficient of the dummy 
“eligible” is above 0.38 and is highly statistically significant. The goodness of fit sta-
tistics 
2R  exceeds 0.27 in all specifications. 
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Results of the estimation of equation (2) are close in absolute value, and correspond 
to a 22-23% increase in reservation wages.17 All effects are statistically significant at 
five or ten percent level (see Panel B, Table 2).18  
To test the validity of our results, we implement two specification tests as suggested 
by Battistin and Rettore (2008) and McCrary (2008), Lee (2008). The test suggested 
by Battistin and Rettore (2008) aims at comparing the outcomes of the non-eligible 
groups and the group of eligible non-participants.19 In the absence of heterogene-
ous response to the program, we should not find significant differences in the out-
comes for the two groups.  Presence of response heterogeneity will cast serious 
doubts on the validity of our identification strategy. We restrict the sample to indi-
viduals who are not eligible to participate in the program and individuals who are 
eligible but choose not to participate and test for the difference in reservation wages 
between two groups using linear regression.20 Panel C, Table 2 presents the coeffi-
cient and standard error of γ . The results do not indicate significant differences in 
the outcomes; moreover the coefficients are close to zero in all specifications.   
                                                
The second test due to McCrary (2008) and Lee (2008) aims to examine whether 
the observed baseline covariates are locally balanced on either side of the eligibility 
threshold.21 The test exploits outcomes that are on a logical ground not affected by 
the eligibility status and are likely to affect the reservation wage. Consider for in-
stance the case of individual wealth. Wealth is known to affect the reservation wage 
(e.g. Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2001). At the same time wealth is accumulated prior 
to eligibility; thus the effect of eligibility on wealth should be close to zero. We apply 
the same procedure as described in Section 4 on a battery of outcomes (see Table 
3). We select a number of covariates capturing individual socio-economic and 
demographic variables which should satisfy the condition described above. The re-
sults in Table 3 indicate that the casual effect of eligibility on the selected variables 
is close to zero and not statistically significant. 
We further examine heterogeneity of the effect by splitting the sample into Males 
and Females, East and West Germany. The results of the estimation are presented 
in Table 4-7. The results are broadly consistent with the previous findings with the 
stronger effect for females and individuals living in the West Germany. The effect of 
17 Marginal effect is calculated according to the following formula: )1)(exp( −γ  
18 To get some guidance on the choice of polynomial functional form we implement Lee and Card 
(2008) test based on the goodness of fit statistics. The test does not reject any of the specifications. 
(Results are available on request). 
19 Section 4.2 of Battistin and Rettore (2008) link this result to earlier literature on testing non-
experimental estimators (e.g. Heckman and Hotz (1989)). 
20 We estimate the following specification:     )()({1 uxbxxRw ++≥= γ  
21 In other words we test if other potentially confounding factors are the smooth functions in the proxi-
mity of the threshold. 
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participation in RULE58 remains large and positive, although statistical significance 
is often affected.   
4.2 Robustness check 
In this section we implement a robustness check. We narrow our observation win-
dow to include individuals who are close to the threshold and check for the robust-
ness of the results. Next, we access robustness of our results towards exclusion of 
explanatory variables. We present results for an 18 and 12 month observation win-
dow. Tables 8 and 9 show the results.  
Restricting the observation window results in higher estimates of the effect of the 
program as compared to our baseline estimates (see Table 2). At the same time we 
do not observe great disparities in the estimated effect between the 18 and 12 
month observation window. As expected, the statistical significance of our results is 
affected.  
In the final check, we restrict the sample to a narrower observation window and ad-
ditionally exclude the explanatory variables gender; region and marital status (see 
Table 9).22 Exclusion of explanatory variables should not affect the estimates since 
in the neighborhood of the threshold, controls should be as good as randomly as-
signed conditional on  and )(⋅a )(⋅b . The estimates are close to that of reported in 
Table 2. As we move to a narrower observation window, the statistical significance 
of our results decline, yet our main result on the strong positive impact of participa-
tion in  RULE58  holds. 
5. Conclusion 
Although job search monitoring increased in almost all OECD countries over the 
past two decades, there is an ongoing discussion in the literature on how exactly 
monitoring affects job search behavior (see OECD, 2000). 
In this paper we investigated the effect of a reduction of job search monitoring on 
the reservation wage of older recipients of welfare benefits in Germany. In Germany, 
unemployed welfare recipients turning 58 years had until the end of 2007 the option 
to receive benefits without having to prove their job search efforts.  
A priori, it is not clear whether participation in this program increases reservation 
wages. However, assuming that monitoring has no real skill-enhancing effects for 
the analyzed population, the general effect of RULE58 on reservation wages would 
be positive. In our empirical analysis we confirm this prediction. In all specifications 
considered, enrollment in RULE58 implies a substantial increase in reservation 
wages of around 23 percentage points.  
                                                
22 Small number of observations prevents us from considering a “narrower“ window. 
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This result suggests that job search monitoring indeed affects job search behavior 
by reducing reservation wages. If tighter job search requirements for unemployment 
benefit recipients significantly reduce their reservation wages, they might help them 
to find a job faster. However, our results should be interpreted with caution. First, the 
analyzed population of older unemployed welfare recipients might react stronger to 
job search requirements than the average unemployed benefit recipient since some 
participants use the program as a way to quasi-early retirement. Second, the ana-
lyzed population has a lower labor market attachment than the average unemployed 
benefit recipient. Therefore, their reservation wages might respond stronger to job 
search monitoring. Third, changes in reservation wages in the analyzed population 
might imply only small changes in their reemployment chances. 
Hence, the question which remains open for further research is whether the ob-
served differences in reservation wages among benefit recipients subject or not sub-
ject to standard job search requirements lead to differences in unemployment dura-
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 




Female 0.51 0.41 0.45 
    
West 0.53 0.59 0.43 
    
Child in household 0.10 0.07 0.05 
    
Disabled 0.26 0.30 0.27 
    
German 0.67 0.65 0.69 
    
Partner in household    
Single 0.38 0.42 0.43 
    












Equivalent net monthly household income (Euro) 
<= 600  0.20 0.19 0.14 
    
601 - 900  0.62 0.56 0.67 
    
> 900  0.18 0.25 0.19 
    
Qualification    
Low qualified 0.25 0.27 0.19 
    
Middle qualified 0.61 0.57 0.64 
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High qualified 0.04 0.04 0.07 
    
Very high qualified 0.18 0.25 0.19 
    
Personal wealth    
House Owner 0.19 0.18 0.12 
    
Debts 0.33 0.41 0.31 
    
Duration of the last Unemployment spell (in months) 
<= 30  0.40 0.39 0.36 
    
30 - 90  0.43 0.43 0.44 
    
> 90  0.17 0.19 0.20 
    
Number of observations  426 154 90 
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Table 2: Effect of participation in the program ’58 regulation’ on reservation 
wages  
(24 months before and after eligibility) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. Eligible 0.382*** 0.396*** 0.387*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0512) (0.0468) 
N 670 670 670 
Adj. R2 0.272 0.273 0.271 
B. Treat 0.218* 0.230** 0.219* 
 (0.115) (0.112) (0.112) 
C. Test 0.0641 0.0636 0.0551 
 (0.0529) (0.0565) (0.0549) 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls are: Living in the West, Male and Single. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1): Linear specification; (2): Quadratic polynomials; (3): Linear spline. 
A: First stage regression (prediction of program participation). 
B: Estimation of participation effect (equation 7). 
C: Test on differences between non-eligibles and eligible non-participants (Battistin and Rettore, 2008). 
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Table 3: Test on other discontinuities around age 58 (Lee, 2008) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Child in household -0.691 -0.868 -0.934 
 (0.499) (0.633) (0.672) 
Disabled -0.043 -0.192 -0.143 
 (0.362) (0.420) (0.424) 
German -0.017 0.083 0.019 
 (0.508) (0.573) (0.564) 
Partner in household    
Non-employed partner 0.703 0.468 0.470 
 (0.488) (0.484) (0.480) 
Employed partner -0.703 -0.468 -0.470 
 (0.488) (0.484) (0.480) 
Equivalent net monthly household income (Euro)  
<= 600  -0.432 -0.480 -0.521 
 (0.426) (0.507) (0.504) 
601 - 900  0.461 0.385 0.450 
 (0.356) (0.391) (0.387) 
> 900  -0.045 0.256 0.170 
 (0.587) (0.543) (0.514) 
Qualification    
Low qualified 0.540 0.484 0.517 
 (0.340) (0.336) (0.325) 
Middle qualified -0.312 -0.333 -0.351 
 (0.303) (0.309) (0.290) 
High qualified 0.010 -0.655 -0.487 
 (0.986) (1.144) (1.162) 
Very high qualified -0.309 0.145 -0.012 
 (0.550) (0.453) (0.431) 
Personal wealth    
House Owner 0.731* 0.574 0.621 
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 (0.378) (0.409) (0.394) 
Debts 0.471 0.294 0.326 
 (0.322) (0.318) (0.313) 
Duration of the last Unemployment (in months)  
<= 30  0.279 0.217 0.207 
 (0.406) (0.439) (0.431) 
30 - 90  -0.182 0.084 0.054 
 (0.425) (0.404) (0.398) 
> 90  -0.158 -0.445 -0.406 
 (0.425) (0.380) (0.403) 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses, Additional controls are: Living in the West,  
Male and Single. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
1): Linear specification; (2): Quadratic polynomials; (3): Linear spline. 
All information refers to the month before our observation period (December 2004). 
a. Definition of qualification dummies: Low qualified refers to no graduation or graduation 
from Sonder-/Haupt- and Realschule and no vocational training, middle qualified refers to 
(Fach-) Abitur and no vocational training, or graduation from Sonder-/Haupt- and Realschule 
and apprenticeship, high qualified refers to (Fach-) Abitur and apprenticeship or master 
craftsmen; very high qualified refers to university degree. 
 
Table 4: Effect of participation in the program ’58 regulation’ on reservation 
wages (24 months before and after eligibility, males) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Eligible 0.382*** 0.394*** 0.387*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0784) (0.0740) 
Adj. R2 0.248 0.248 0.247 
Treat 0.113 0.127 0.115 
 (0.164) (0.161) (0.163) 
N 349 349 349 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1): Linear specification; (2): Quadratic polynomials; (3): Linear spline. 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls are: Living in the West and Single. 
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Table 5: Effect of participation in the program ’58 regulation’ on reservation 
wages (24 months before and after eligibility, females) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Eligible 0.387*** 0.397*** 0.386*** 
 (0.0558) (0.0776) (0.0710) 
Adj. R2 0.298 0.296 0.296 
Treat 0.300* 0.300 0.292 
 (0.176) (0.202) (0.200) 
N 321 321 321 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls are: Living in the West and Single. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1): Linear specification; (2): Quadratic polynomials; (3): Linear spline. 
Table 6: Effect of participation in the program ’58 regulation’ on reservation 
wages (24 months before and after eligibility, East Germany) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Eligible 0.396*** 0.373*** 0.380*** 
 (0.0707) (0.0842) (0.0730) 
adj. R2 0.334 0.335 0.337 
Treat 0.160 0.235 0.194 
 (0.168) (0.176) (0.164) 
N 315 315 315 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls are: Male and Single.* 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1): Linear specification; (2): Quadratic polynomials; (3): Linear spline. 
 
Table 7: Effect of participation in the program ’58 regulation’ on reservation 
wages (24 months before and after eligibility, West Germany) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Eligible 0.363*** 0.391*** 0.381*** 
 (0.0582) (0.0694) (0.0683) 
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adj. R2 0.210 0.217 0.214 
Treat 0.279 0.253 0.245 
 (0.172) (0.159) (0.158) 
N 355 355 355 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls are: Male and Single. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1): Linear specification; (2): Quadratic polynomials; (3): Linear spline. 
Table 8: Effect of participation in the program ’58 regulation’ on reservation 
wages (18 and 12 months before and after eligibility) 
18 month (1) (2) (3) 
Eligible 0.355*** 0.354*** 0.354*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0542) (0.0483) 
adj. R2 0.266 0.264 0.265 
Treat 0.347** 0.332** 0.342** 
 (0.128) (0.129) (0.128) 
N 514 514 514 
12 month    
age58 0.253*** 0.259*** 0.268*** 
 (0.0482) (0.0252) (0.0225) 
adj. R2 0.269 0.276 0.276 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treat 0.340 0.348* 0.355* 
 (0.201) (0.197) (0.188) 
N 363 363 363 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls are: Living in the West, Male and Single. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 











Table 9: Effect of participation in the program ’58 regulation’ on reservation 
wages (18 and 12 months before and after eligibility, excluding 
covariates) 
18 month (1) (2) (3) 
Eligible 0.366*** 0.366*** 0.365*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0482) 
adj. R2 0.264 0.264 0.264 
Treat 0.224* 0.224* 0.239* 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.127) 
N 514 514 514 
12 month    
Eligible 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.285*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0213) 
adj. R2 0.271 0.271 0.272 
Treat 0.208 0.208 0.230 
 (0.197) (0.197) (0.191) 
N 363 363 363 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
(1): Linear specification; (2): Quadratic polynomials; (3): Linear spline. 
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